This makes Myanmar, to the Indian Ocean and a way to undercut China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” A. The truce along the Line of Control won’t bring peace, but it does offer new opportunities for cooperation. China's State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi is welcomed by and Myanmar's state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, Jan. 11, 2021. China’s inroads into the political roadmap of Myanmar is visibly evident from its role in the nationwide reconciliation with the ethnic rebels in the country. Following this, the Tatmadaw declared a four-month unilateral ceasefire in north and east, in order to improve conditions for negotiations. The biggest challenge to the effort will continue to be UWSP’s leadership of the bloc demanding a renegotiation of the terms. between China and Myanmar has become visibly significant again, showing the extent of China’s grip over the politics and economics of Myanmar. Her official visits to China have been viewed as largely fruitful, resulting in a greater understanding between the two countries, and helping shield Myanmar from international ostracism. India could also try to outbid China by seeking to offer development and investment assistance of its own. One of the flagship projects of China-Myanmar cooperation is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Asia, Asia But among the new Chinese projects, the deep-water port in Kyaukpyu stands out as perhaps the most important in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical interests throughout the wider region. A number of projects have been initiated in recent years as a sign of burgeoning cooperation between China and Myanmar. This makes Myanmar a major access route to the Indian Ocean and a way to undercut China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” A 15-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was arrived at between China and Myanmar on the CMEC. The move is an important step in reviving intra-regional tourism and recovery from the coronavirus recession. "Beijing is happy to do business with anyone in power in Myanmar… Weeks prior to the Panglong Peace Conference in May 2017, UWSP led the formation of a new seven-member Federal Political Negotiation and Coordination Committee (FPNCC). Suu Kyi has been heavily criticized for her silence, but China has shielded her regime and the military in the UN, a Security Council statement drafted by the UK. Indian officials say China is assisting rebel groups that have stepped up attacks on its border with Myanmar in recent months, opening another … FPNCC and Northern Alliance participated in the third Panglong Conference on China’s initiative. Although Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationship with China has been complicated given her stature as a pro-democracy leader, in her more recent political career as State Counsellor she has a pragmatic route with regard to foreign policy. A close defense partner could provide what it needs. After much speculation that Myanmar, in its intention to move toward political transition was showing signs of moving toward western countries. The prospect that China would use commercial ports to expand the overseas reach of its navy has been around for years and has yet to fully materialize; while China has openly turned Djibouti into a military facility, other Chinese-owned ports, such as those in Sri Lanka and Cambodia, have only sporadically hosted Chinese naval vessels so far. However, the more powerful ethnic groups abstained, including those along Myanmar’s northern border with China. “They are undeniably preparing for future naval operations in the area to secure their strategic and energy interests,” Khurana said. Beginning during the Obama administration, and continuing under U.S. President Donald Trump, India has also shed decades of reluctance to align too closely with the United States and has inked defense deals with Washington that help bolster its naval capacities. In Washington policy circles, greater engagement with India to secure the Indian Ocean is seen as a vital plank in America’s naval rivalry with China, which centers on the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, especially the defense of Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan. Power, Crossroads That’s partly a response to a greatly increased Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean: What began as three-ship anti-piracy patrols in 2008 became 10 years later swarms of submarines and amphibious ships, and soon, perhaps, patrols by China’s only operational aircraft carrier. How will the February 1, 2021, coup in Myanmar affect the country’s internal security and foreign relations? Suu Kyi has been heavily criticized for her silence, but China has shielded her regime and the military in the UN by whittling down a Security Council statement drafted by the UK. The port is expected to be another key development in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. But Indian and U.S. naval officers are increasingly concerned that China’s port-buying spree is laying the groundwork to enable its already huge and growing navy to dominate waters far from the Chinese coast. Coup a further complication for tricky Myanmar-China ties. Eight ethnic groups signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015. The transportation route follows gas and oil pipelines built in 2013 and 2017. China will develop a multi-billion-dollar deep sea port in Myanmar's Kyaukpyu town along the Bay of Bengal, a development that will concern India which already has … At the same time, if the situation between Naypyidaw and the EAOs is maintained at a steady simmer, China will get to. Monish Tourangbam is Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India. At the same time, the government continues to carry out, with other non-signatory EAOS, including the KIO. How does modern China measure up to that standard? At the same time, the government continues to carry out negotiations with other non-signatory EAOS, including the KIO. China is indispensable to all political entities in Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military). In the best-case scenario, Myanmar would be rich like the East and democratic like the West. Closing that logistics gap—something the U.S. Navy did at sea during World War II, and with overseas bases in the decades that followed—became a priority for the Chinese navy after its first long-distance naval deployments to fight piracy off Somalia more than a decade ago. “They have no illusions about China,” he said. How Vietnam's communist party chief earned a surprise third term at this year's National Congress. China and India are spending a collective $2 billion to build deepwater ports, within 40 miles of each other, on Myanmar’s coast. It has provided about $30 billion for different kinds of infrastructure financing all over the world since about 2003, he estimates, but that pales in comparison to the headline figures of China’s $1 trillion Belt and Road. China’s ties with the ethnic armed groups is not a recent phenomenon. The fear of falling into a Chinese “debt trap” has been palpable in Myanmar, too. At the bilateral level, the government and the military establishment of Myanmar receives diplomatic dividends for maintaining good ties with China. This concern is highlighted when one compares the Kyauk Phyu port and SEZ projects — which was awarded to China’s CITIC group — with the Thilawa and Dawei SEZs, being developed by Japanese investments.